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RETROACTIVE IMMUNITY:

A LEGISLATIVE FAux PAs?

Scorr DRAPER*
n modern societies around the world, people interact with the
private sector in innumerable ways: People make phone calls,
watch T.V., shop at department stores, stay in hotels, make
purchases online, rent apartments, and keep money in banks,
just to name a few. Records of consumers' transactions are recorded and maintained by phone companies, cable companies, department stores, hotels, Internet Service Providers (ISPs), landlords,
and banks, respectively!
These records, kept by thousands of private companies, have attracted the attention of U.S. intelligence agencies in their mission to
track down terrorists. 2 From these records, government agencies can
accumulate a broad amount of information about a person, such as
reading materials, purchases, diseases, and web activities. This information can allow intelligence agencies to make a personal profile
of a person's finances, health, psychology, beliefs, politics, interests,
and lifestyle. 3
Because some private firms have disclosed their customers'
information to the government without the customers' knowledge,
many firms have faced lawsuits for disclosing this information. In
order to defend companies who have provided the government with
the intelligence it seeks, Congress created a law that protects these
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companies from lawsuits-a protection called "retroactive immunity."
While this protection ostensibly appears to be a necessary, even
patriotic, action to protect companies from greedy trial lawyers,
retroactive immunity is fundamentally flawed and unnecessary for
three reasons: First, immunity has already been provided by a 1986
statute; this law has not been repealed and remains in force. Second,
retroactive immunity shields companies from the judicial process
for a limited time; any company that helped the government after
January 17, 2007, will still be subject to the requirements outlined in
existing statutes. Third, retroactive immunity prevents a transparent review of the activities of the Bush administration, which bad
been the strongest proponent of retroactive immunity. The administration's actions, along with its means of persuasion used to compel
companies to disclose intelligence, merit careful review, and even an
investigation. If the administration had acted illegally, then it, not
the telecommunication companies, deserves the lawsuits.
The article is divided into six parts. Part I provides basic background behind the events that led to this protection. Part II demonstrates the previous existence of liability protection under an existing statute. Part III argues against the government's state secrets
privilege because this privilege blocks pending litigation that could
exonerate suspected telecommunication companies. Part IV examines the future ramifications of retroactive immunity, including the
future cooperation of telecommunication companies and the dangerous precedent this law sets for future legislation. Part V discusses the
possible trampling upon the rule of law by the Bush administration.
And Part VI summarizes the arguments that Congress should repeal
retroactive immunity and allow suspected companies to assert their
defense in a court oflaw.

I.

B ACKGROUND

Shortly after the September I Ph terrorist attacks, the executive
branch dispatched directives and written requests to U.S. electronic
communication service providers to obtain the customer and per-
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4

sonal information of suspected terrorists. These executive letters
stated that the intelligence-gathering activities "had been authorized
by the President ... [and] had been determined to be lawful by the
Attorney General."5
In December 2005, the American public was shocked to read in
the New York Times that telecommunication companies had allowed
the National Security Agency (NSA) to trace and analyze large volumes of call records ·and Internet communications without a courtapproved warrant. 6 It wasn't until February of 2006 that the press
reported the first mention of specific companies, namely AT&T,
MCI (now part of Verizon), and Sprint.1 This revelation sparked a
congressional debate over whether private companies being sued
could demonstrate their defense in court, or if all electronic communication service providers should receive a liability shield called
"retroactive immunity." This immunity would protect companies
from lawsuits directed at their efforts in assisting the government
from September 11, 2001, to January 17, 20071 when the government
ceased its Terrorist Surveillance Program. The House of Representatives originally rejected the retroactive immunity provision, but later
included it in the final version of the bill. The Senate agreed with the
House and voted in favor of retroactive immunity, and on July 10,
2008, President Bush signed the "Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008" (FISA Amendments Act of
2008) bill, thus making retroactive immunity the law of the land.

II.

TELECOMMUNICATION COMPANIES ALREADY HAD IMMUNITY

Telecommunication companies that legally provide intelligence
to the government already had immunity before Congress passed
4
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the FISA Amendments Act. This statute, dating back to 1986, states
the following: "No cause of action shall lie in any court against any

provider of wire or electronic communication service ... in accordance with the terms of a court order, statutory authorization, or
certification under this cbapter," 8 provided that the Attorney General
issues a certification to a service provider stating that "no warrant or
court order is required by law, that all statutory requirements have
been met, and that the specified assistance is required." 9 On the other
hand, if companies disclosed their customers' records to the government in a manner inconsistent with the above statute, then they do
not qualify for immunity.
The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence reviewed the merits of retroactive immunity in October 2007 to determine how to
revise the FISA law of 1978, which ultimately led to the enactment
of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008. In the course of its investigation, the committee determined that the telecommunication companies would be unwilling to assist the government because of what
the committee called "unnecessary court involvement and protracted litigation."10 This unnecessary court involvement is the kind of
court involvement that is necessary to prove the innocence, or guilt,
of these companies. Granting blind immunity to avoid unnecessary
court involvement and protracted litigation blinds the principles of
law and justice.
A similar concern was raised by Congressman John Boehner
(R-OH) that the absence of retroactive immunity "open[s] up a wide
avenue for trial lawyers to hold communication companies at bay
and threaten their very willingness to help."11 Again, if the companies are innocent and go to court to prove their innocence, then
they have nothing to fear. The trial lawyers can work day and night
to demonstrate the culpability of these companies, but their efforts
8

18 U.S. C. § 2511 (2)(a)(ii).

9
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need not hinder the telecommunication companies from continuing
assistance to the Intelligence Community.
In sum, not only is retroactive immunity unnecessary legislation, but it also blankets all companies from the probing eyes of judicial scrutiny. This current legislation keeps potential law-breaking
companies safe from prosecution, and simultaneously perpetuates
the popular stigma that the companies are all guilty, and have clamored for immunity to keep their secrets safe. Retroactive immunity
should be repealed, and the telecommunication companies should
have their day in court.

III. THE STATE SEcRETs IssuE
In order to clear themselves of any wrong-doing, telecommunication companies should go to court to prove their innocence, as the
1986 law provides. However, these companies are not able to demonstrate their guilt or innocence because of the government's perpetual
assertion of the state secrets privilege. This privilege, if asserted in
an unfolding court case, requires that the case be dismissed entirely,
or that the discovery process be significantly limited.12 These procedures keep sensitive information from being disclosed to the public,
which the government justifies as protecting national security. 13
The proponents of retroactive immunity assert the following
about the opponents of retroactive immunity:
Those who ask why the companies need such protection if
they did nothing illegal are missing the fundamental point
that the government's invocation of the states secrets privilege precludes these companies from asserting valid defenses and providing the court with any factual evidence
12

See Holly Wells, The State Secrets Privilege: Overuse Causing Unintended
Consequences, 50 ARIZ. L. REv. 967, 968 (2008).

13

See Ellen C. Yaroshefsky, Secret Evidence and the Courts in the Age of
National Security: The Slow Erosion of the Adversaty System: Article /II
Courts, FISA, CIPA and Ethical Dilemmas, 5 CARDOZO P uB. L. P oL'Y &
ETHICS J. 203, 203-{)4 (2006).
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confirming or denying their involvement in the program. As
a result, these companies cannot defend themselves even if
they never participated in the program. 14
In other words, the proponents of retroactive immunity point out that
the companies cannot prove their innocence because the government
will not aUow them to do so. These proponents assume, however,
that the courts cannot override the state secrets privilege.
The state secrets privilege is not specifically written in statute,
but is rather a "common law evidentiary privilege instilled with
constitutional overtones." 15 The privilege has been understood to be
part of the President's Article II powers as Commander-in-Chief. 16
Since the privilege is not set in legal stone, the state secrets privilege
can be ignored by the courts after applying a balancing test created
by the Supreme Court. This test weigbs "the necessity of the party
seeking the information against the appropriateness of the government's invocation of the privilege." 17 Perhaps the companies' necessity of seeking information that would exonerate them does little to
outweigh the state secrets privilege. But if the companies' lawyers
were to bring suit against the Bush administration for conducting an
illegal dragnet of surveillance, which appears likely, then the courts
could ignore the state secrets privilege and investigate further.
In fact, the courts could review evidence based on the original
House bill of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008,18 which provided
" for a process to allow district courts to review classified evidence
in camera and ex parte (in front of the judge without the presence of
the plaintiff)." 19 In this way, state secrets would be kept secret, and
private companies could provide their evidence in court. However,
because the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 offers full immunity,
14

SeeS. Rep. No. 110- 209, at 35, 36.

15

Supra note 12, at 972.
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See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,710 (1974).
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Supra note 12, at 974.
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See FISAAmendments Act of2008, H.R. 6304, !lOth Cong. § 802 (2008).

19
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the public cannot know if these companies are innocent or guilty
because these companies cannot be sued.

IV.

FUTURE RAMIFICATIONS

The FISA Amendments Act of2008 gives immunity to companies who may have provided assistance to the government during
the period between September 11, 2001, and January 17, 2007.20 But
what if the telecommunication companies provide assistance to the
government after January 17, 2007? Representative Jerrold Nadler
(D-NY) ofNew York's eighth congressional district said,
Even if we gave retroactive immunity for the future to the
telecom company that helped us next week, they still have
the same requirements for immunity. And if they wanted to
go to court to assert them if someone sued them, they would
still have to go to court and say the same thing. So you are
dealing with a one-time fix. 21
In other words, the service providers that provide intelligence after
January 17, 2007, will not be protected by the immunity granted in
the FISA Act. Thus, the retroactive immunity provision in the Act
is a one-time fix because it only covers companies from September
11, 2001, to January 17, 2007. Those companies that assist the government after January 17, 2007, will be required to go to court and
assert their defense.
The proponents of retroactive immunity echo the concerns
of Mike McConnell, the former Director of National Intelligence,
that some telecommunication companies might not want to help
the government if they could be sued after January 17, 2007. After
collaborating with telecommunication companies, Mr. McConnell
learned that the companies would not give future assistance to
20

SeeFISAAmendmentsActof2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261,122 Stat. 2435,
2469 (2008).

21
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the government without immunity.22 Mr. McConnell, who was
determined to see that the companies would not be sued, had
repeatedly argued for retroactive immunity before Congress. On one
such occasion, be told the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, "It is critical that we provide protection to the private
sector so that they can assist the Intelligence Community protect our
national security."23 This reason has served as the basis for the arguments of the proponents of retroactive immunity. Proponents further
argue that because Mr. McConnell "transcends any kind of politics
or partisanship"24 and "bas spent four decades of his life working
in the intelligence field,"25 those reasons are strong enough to enact
retroactive immunity.
First of all, the private sector, more specifically the telecommunication companies, may be unwilling to assist the government
in complying with future requests for surveillance. However, in the
event that the companies do not cooperate, the government could
still acquire intelligence from them. Since the 1970s, the principal wiretapping statute, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(FISA), granted government the power to compel "communication
common carriers" to comply with government requests for surveillance. 26 Not only is this true, but FISA provides for a special court
(Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court) to issue court orders to
telecommunication companies to furnish intelligenceP By any of
these two methods, the government can secure the cooperation of
telecommunication companies. So, to conclude that the voluntary
cooperation of the telecommunication companies is the only way
22

See id. at HI710.

23

House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence: Hearing on the Protect America Act o/2007 Before the Permanent Select Commillee on Intelligence, I 09th Cong. 17 (2007) (statement of J. Michael McConnell, former
Director ofNarionallntelligence).

24

Supra note ll,atHI710.

25

!d.

26

See 153 CoNG. REc. 815710,8157 17 {2007).
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See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S. C. § 1805 (c)(2){B).
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that the government could obtain their information is erroneous and
misleading rhetoric.
Second, that Mr. McConnell "transcends any kind of politics or
partisanship" and "has spent four decades of his life working in the
intelligence field" is not relevant to the issue of Congress granting
retroactive immunity. Someone that transcends politics has little to
do with granting retroactive immunity, unless he or she is an authority on the legal ramifications that retroactive immunity could effect,
like a lawyer. Furthermore, spending four decades working in the
intelligence field does not qualify someone to give sound advice regarding the legal outcomes of retroactive immunity. Although Mr.
McConnell is an excellent authority on intelligence-gathering from
the private sector, lawmakers should base their decisions on legal
criteria, not on the credentials of another professional not associated
with the legislative branch.
Just as the judicial branch can set precedents through the way
they rule on cases, the legislative branch also enacts statutes that can
become precedents for future legislation.28 This immunity provision
enacted by Congress, according to Representative Sander Levin (0MI), is a dangerous precedent that will influence future legislation.29
After the Bush administration bestows absolute immunity on telecommunication companies, Congress is only a short step away from
granting immunity to the entire private sector. After the phone and
Internet records of citizens are unlawfully disclosed, their financial
and medical records could be next. 30 This precedent could also allow "federal agents or local cops who don't have a court order [to]
demand private or confidential information [from businesses] about
their customers." 31 Even worse, this law could encourage the executive to overstep the law and abuse the liberties of its citizens without
fear of getting caught.
28

See Mark Tushnet, Stare Decisis and Nonjudicial Actors: Legislative and
Executive Stare Decisis, 83 NOTRE D AME L. REv. 1339, 1341 (2008).

29

See 154 CoNG.
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THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S CRY FOR IMMUNITY

Considering the immunity already provided to telecommunication companies and the government 's relentless assertion of the state
secrets privilege, it seems that the Bush administration, not the companies, is the guilty party. After all,
[T]he loudest demands for blanket immunity did not come
from the telecommunications companies but from the administration, which raises the interesting question of whether the administration's real motivation is to shield from
public disclosure the ways and means by which government
officials may have 'persuaded' telecommunications companies to assist in its warrantless surveillance programsY
Similarly, Congresswoman Zoe Lofgren (D-CA), who is a member of the House Committee on the Judiciary, said, "I think the administration is more concerned about their liability than the phone
companies."33
We do not know much about the Bush administration's unlawful actions, but as an example of the administration's persuasive
means to gather intelligence, "Joseph Nacchio, the former CEO of
Qwest, alleges that his company was denied NSA contracts after he
declined in a February 27, 2001, meeting at Fort Meade with National Security Agency, NSA, representatives to give the NSA customer
calling records." 34
If the Bush administration had treaded upon the rule oflaw,
then the employees of the former administration, including George
W. Bush, should be sued so that the scope of the Bush administration's illegal activity can be scrutinized. However, if telecommunication companies cannot appear in court to demonstrate to a judge
that the Bush administration either lawfully compelled them or deceived them, then any investigation would be handicapped and never
be able to determine the truth.
32

Supra note II, at H1 712.

33

/d.atHI718.

34

!d. at H 1751.
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CONCLUSION

The above arguments can be summarized in the following ways:
First, the immunity already granted to the telecommunication companies in a 1986 law is sufficient for protecting companies against
lawsuits. Second, the state secrets privilege utilized by the government to block civil suits brought against telecommunication companies would be irrelevant if the companies could assert their defense
to a judge under the conditions expressed in the House version of the
FISA Amendments Act of2008. Third, the provision for retroactive
immunity shields the companies from participating in the judicial
process for only a narrow time frame. Companies that helped the
government after January 17, 2007, will be subject to the requirements outlined in existing statutes. Fifth, the future cooperation of
the telecommun ication companies should not be an issue to the government because if it feels a need for intelligence from these companies, then the government can follow the law and either ask a federal
judge to issue a court order, or ask the Attorney General to dispatch
a directive to the uncooperative company to furnish the desired intelligence. And the retroactive immunity provision sets a dangerous
precedent that could influence lawmakers in the future. Sixth, the
Bush administration appears to have overstepped its legal bounds,
and should be investigated.
Therefore, Congress should review title II of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 and repeal the retroactive immunity provision
through future legislation. If immunity were retracted, at least
several dozen or more lawsuits would be filed against the telecommunication companies alleged to have provided information to the
government. However, if the companies are able to demonstrate that
they received a directive from the Attorney General or a court order
from a federal judge, then they will be protected from all lawsuits,
as stated in Title 18 U.S.C. §2511. The retraction of the retroactive
immunity provision will enable the government to restore the rule of
law, re-enable the j udiciary to perform its duty-which is to determine the culpability or innocence of the telecommunication companies- and restore the government's trust with the American people.

